The Growth of China’s Navy: Past, Present, and Future

Details: Category: Seguridad marítima; Published on Wednesday, 21 January 2026 06:16; Written by Administrator2; Hits: 89

A review of major developments in the PLAN over the past 5 years – and where the fleet is likely to go from here.

January 19, 2026

The Growth of China’s Navy: Past, Present, and Future

Credit: Sina Weibo

Various major projects for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have reached fruition in recent years. Alongside these developments, it has become increasingly common to see defense media and commentary write about a supposed fleet size or shipbuilding advantage for the PLAN, often relative to the U.S. Navy. This has been particularly pronounced in the context of anxieties around U.S. naval shipbuilding vitality, program delays, and some recent shifts in surface combatant programs such as the Constellation-class frigate and the Trump-class battleship.

I have documented various PLAN procurement efforts in the past half decade. Now it’s time to review some of these past projections in context of what actually materialized. At the same time, we can assess those common narratives by defense commentators (such as the relevance of the shipbuilding industry and fleet size) in the context of genuine PLAN advancements across the board. Finally, I will briefly review the prospective missions for the evolving PLAN, and the possible trajectories of future growth and platforms.

The PLAN Today

In 2019, I made a broad projection for an order of battle for the PLAN of 2030. Although it is four years early, reviewing this estimate can help to contextualize the situation in 2026.

In terms of surface combatants, eight 055 destroyers are in service with a further six in post-launch; between 25-30 052D destroyers are in service with a further 10 or more post-launch, complemented by six older 052C destroyers; two 054B frigates and over 40 054A frigates are in service, with an additional half dozen or more 054As post-launch. Eleven older but upgraded destroyers are in service, as well as 50 056A corvettes and a handful of older frigates.

In terms of large amphibious ships, eight 071 amphibious landing docks are in service, complemented by four 075 helicopter landing ships, with one 076 catapult equipped helicopter landing ship in sea trials. These are complemented by up to 30 072 family tank landing ships, and various smaller conventional and air cushion landing craft.

Three aircraft carriers are in service: the ski jump-equipped Liaoning and Shandong, and the catapult-equipped Fujian. However, Fujian was only commissioned in late 2025 and will take time to reach initial operating capability.

The exact number of PLAN submarines is difficult to substantiate; however it is estimated that between 50-60 diesel electric submarines (SSKs) are in service (with recent production composed of modern 039B and 039C classes), and between six and 10 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are in service with an additional four to fix in fitting out or sea trials. Of the total SSN count in the water, up to eight of these were launched since 2022, of the more capable 09IIIB class. Between 6-8 09IV family ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are in service.

Additional vessels of all categories are either actively under construction, or are likely to re-commence production in coming years. This cursory summary shows that the PLAN seems reasonably on its way toward my 2019 prediction of a 2030 fleet composition (the full details are viewable in the prior article).

A Caveat on Popular Comparisons Regarding the PLAN

This growth in PLAN fleet size and tonnage has led many general news outlets (and some defense media outlets and government agencies) to use hull count to describe the PLAN as the “world’s largest,” especially in drawing direct comparison to the U.S. Navy.

Many have rightly critiqued the use of hull count as an implied proxy for overall naval capability, as it does not reflect the qualitative capability of each vessel. A 1,400-ton 056A corvette is very different from a 13,000-ton 055 destroyer which is different still from a 100,000 ton Ford-class aircraft carrier, yet all constitute “one ship.” Other measures, such as tonnage, or vertical launch system armament, have been explored as measures of more merit.

Overall, it is undeniable the PLAN has grown substantially regardless of which of these metrics one chooses, but describing it as the “world’s largest navy” without caveat is usually an indicator of poor understanding or a sign of an impending straw-man argument.

Shipbuilding capacity (inclusive of active shipyards and civilian shipbuilding) has become another area of consternation in recent years. The difference between Chinese and American shipbuilding capacity is more materially true than the notion of the PLAN “overtaking” the U.S. Navy in size. That said, China’s supposedly “200 times greater” shipbuilding capacity does not have a linear relationship with real naval deliverables. Naval shipbuilding is not a function of shipbuilding capacity alone but is also bottlenecked by key subsystems (powerplants, sensors, weapons, computing), not to mention limited by funding for procurement and operating costs and personnel.

It is true that shipbuilding capacity benefits naval construction, but the extent of exploitable potential depends on the resolution of other bottlenecks. It would be prudent for the defense commentariat to frequently acknowledge those nuances, so as to avoid the risk of inadvertent impressions among the general populace.

Furthermore, in event of a high intensity conflict, the long-lead nature of naval shipbuilding means relevant naval capability of each side may be weighted far more in favor of existing in-service or near-service vessels rather than the ability to spin up new construction, though of course this depends on the time span of a conflict.

Remaining Gaps for the PLAN

The PLAN’s fleet modernization has been accompanied by new sensors (radars, passive sensing and electro-optics, and sonar, among others), networking, as well as substantial weapons types to go with them. Many types of subsonic, supersonic, and more recently, hypersonic anti-ship weapons, are in service with PLAN ships, submarines, and aircraft, and increasing varieties of shipborne surface-to-air missiles and torpedo systems with greater capability and sophistication also exist.

Describing these sensors and weapons could fill multiple articles on their own, but it is prudent to recognize these advancements to visualize that, broadly speaking, China’s new surface combatants and submarines have dovetailed with commensurately modern subsystems and weapons.

It is also appropriate to identify remaining gaps in capabilities, platforms, and systems. Such a statement itself is somewhat loaded, as it implies an expected level of minimal naval capability, which is in turn dependent on the strategic missions a navy is given by its government. However, for generic high intensity multidomain conflict needs, some obvious needs can be identified.

Organic shipborne naval aviation is a major domain to expand in scale and mature. This involves not only additional carrier aviation beyond the existing three carriers in service, but also the proliferation of helicopters, including modern multirole anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters such as the Z-20F. The consolidation and expansion of shipborne aviation is now less of a technological and industrial challenge, and more dependent on funding and time – but in the context of the many demands facing the PLAN, those elements do not come free.

Undersea warfare, inclusive of both SSNs, SSKs, and surface and aerial ASW and their requisite sensors, weapons, and networking, are related domains where the PLAN is likely not yet comfortable or satisfied with its progress, despite significant advances in capability.

At present, the PLAN fields the world’s largest surface combatant fleet equipped with “twin tail” sonar suites (towed linear sonar and variable depth sonar). PLAN vessel with “twin tail” sonar include the entire 055, 052D, and 056A fleet, as well as its modern frigate fleet (except for the initial 16 hulls of 054A) – in total, over 130 ships in the water. At least a few dozen land-based fixed wing ASW aircraft in the form of KQ-200 family platforms are in service, with a more modern iteration entering service in the last couple of years. The aforementioned Z-20F will also offer a modern 10-ton class helicopter for organic shipborne aerial ASW. At least two different standoff missile-torpedo systems are in service with PLAN surface combatants.

Further expansion of ASW capability, as well as further modernization of the PLAN’s SSK fleet (replacing the remaining 039 and Kilo-class hulls), will likely be on the cards. Furthermore, a significant growth of the SSN fleet size will be necessary to provide persistent long-distance undersea escorts, as well as to enable a more credible long-range, attack submarine fleet capable of independent missions. SSN procurement will be dependent on qualitative advancements in performance (including acoustic stealth), which will be subject of a future article – but it is identifiable as a venue for growth nevertheless.

Maturation of China’s SSBN capability is also a gap to be filled. That depends not only upon related advancements in nuclear submarine technology, but also on progress of strategic systems such as ballistic missiles, strategic command/control, and overall nuclear deterrence doctrine.

Following the above, other gaps for the PLAN exist largely in line with other global naval forces. The PLAN will also pursue new surface combatant successor classes and consider what their requisite hullforms, weaponry, powerplants, and sensors should entail. Unmanned surface, underwater, and aerial platforms are being investigated by the PLAN and likely will be major components of a future force at some point. Advancement of existing sensor and weapons concepts, and maturation of more exotic weapon types (directed energy weapons, possibly railguns, among others), and dispersed and containerized systems, are likely to factor into future procurement as well. Further integration of multi-domain sensors and fires, closer coordination with spaceborne assets, and advancements of combat management systems (including automation and “artificial intelligence”) are generic but necessary to acknowledge.

Trajectory of a 2035 Fleet

As of this writing, in mid-January 2026, it is somewhat more difficult to predict a prospective PLAN fleet for 2035, relative to predicting a 2030 fleet back in 2019. This is partly a result of greater secrecy from the Chinese language grapevine, and partly due to a greater variety of potential confounding procurement priorities and technological factors.

PLAN surface combatants are likely to continue to grow and modernize up to 2035, and some successor classes to the 055, 052D, and 054A/B respectively, may emerge during this period. Successor surface combatant classes may seek to pursue electrical propulsion, newer and larger hullforms with advancements in sensors and weaponry, as well as greater endurance and crewing facilities.

Additional aircraft carriers are likely to enter the water or enter service by 2035, coinciding with greater maturation of the carrier airwing. Already, a suspected nuclear-powered carrier has been photographed and rumored to be in early assembly at Dalian shipyard, and a conventionally powered carrier is rumored to be in fabrication at Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. The recent Chinese Military Power Report from the U.S. Department of Defense suggested the PLAN may possess nine carriers by 2035, but this seems far-fetched (and the phrasing was non-specific in the original paper). Reaching nine carriers would necessitate an additional six carriers to be launched by 2035, which would be unlikely even if China were able to sustain continuous dual-yard carrier construction between now and 2035.

It is also likely that the PLAN will expand its SSN (and possibly SSBN) fleet size. The most modern classes – the in-production 09IIIB and forthcoming 09V class SSNs – are suggested to offer significant qualitative advancements in capability. The PLAN is apparently satisfied enough to sign off on relatively large-scale production, with somewhere from six to eight 09IIIB hulls launched over the course of three years.

The capability demands of a localized Taiwan conflict are already somewhat met by existing PLAN capabilities. However, the PLAN’s readiness is likely still benchmarked toward the prospect of a larger scale conflict – such as one involving the U.S. Navy. Forthcoming PLAN advancements will likely seek to enable operations further out into the Western Pacific and potentially Central Pacific, under wartime conditions, to confront U.S. naval forces and island facilities in those regions supported by friendly multidomain assets.

Meanwhile, longer distance peacetime deployments composed of larger scale taskforces will likely become more regular occurrences, both for training purposes and for signaling purposes. Overall, the PLAN will trend towards possessing a more well-rounded, sophisticated and sustained blue water presence in peacetime, while focusing primarily on fighting a high intensity multidomain conflict in the Western Pacific.