For years, ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been framed as a debate over maritime law and sovereignty, despite consistent support from the Pentagon, industry leaders and bipartisan national security officials. Presidents have backed it and more than two decades ago, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously urged accession. 

And yet, the United States has never acted. 

This is the moment. 

Between continued instability in the Strait of Hormuz and a fast-moving race for critical minerals on the ocean floor, the U.S. has been handed something rare in foreign policy: a clear, time-bound strategic opening. 

Maritime Order Without Membership 

Let’s start with Hormuz. 

Even at the height of regional instability, the world still looks to American naval power to step in when the arteries of global commerce — sea lanes that carry roughly 90 percent of global trade — are obstructed. We saw it in the Black Sea after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We’re seeing it again in the Strait of Hormuz, even as the United States is itself entangled in the crisis. In any resumption of commercial shipping, Washington will be central — and indispensable to ensuring it stays that way. 

Keeping those routes open demands credible force and consistent application of international law, reinforced by coalitions that extend U.S. reach and legitimacy. 

But there’s a contradiction. The United States is attempting to enforce a maritime order it has never formally joined. 

In practice, Washington already treats UNCLOS as customary international law when defending navigation rights. But remaining outside the treaty is a strategic liability. It weakens U.S. standing and makes its legal arguments easier to contest. 

Legitimacy as Leverage

That vulnerability is on full display in today’s conflict in the Gulf. Iran has signed but not ratified the Convention, and is now advancing expansive claims of maritime authority, including the right to regulate, tax and restrict transit through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Ratifying UNCLOS would close that gap — bolstering U.S. legal authority, deepening cooperation with treaty partners and sharpening its ability to push back against unlawful restrictions in one of the world’s most critical chokepoints. It would also deny adversaries like Iran an easy line of attack, undercutting their ability to distort U.S. actions in their disinformation campaigns. 

In an era of contested norms, legitimacy is leverage. Allies are more cautious and adversaries all too eager to cast U.S. actions as selective. Formal alignment with the rules Washington already enforces would be a clear strategic advantage. 

The Next Geopolitical Frontier: The Seabed 

Then there’s the seabed. 

The next geopolitical contest isn’t over territory, but what lies beneath. 

Critical minerals like cobalt, nickel and manganese — essential to manufacturing and defense — sit in vast quantities on the deep ocean floor, well beyond national jurisdiction. Some of the richest deposits lie in the Pacific’s Clarion-Clipperton Zone, where competition is already fierce. 

The rules for extracting those resources are being written now by the International Seabed Authority, created under UNCLOS to govern mining in international waters. 

Again, the United States is on the outside — absent from the rulemaking process while simultaneously attempting to shape outcomes from the sidelines. 

Because the U.S. has not ratified the treaty, Washington participates only as an observer to ISA. It cannot legally sponsor American companies for internationally recognized mining licenses or vote on rules governing extraction. It has no formal role in determining the environmental and commercial standards that will define the industry for decades. 

Recent efforts by the Administration to issue deep-sea mining licenses only underscore the problem. Legally uncertain and unlikely to gain international recognition, they risk creating confusion for U.S. firms and inviting disputes rather than securing access. 

Congress has spent years focused on securing critical mineral supply chains. Yet in the deep sea — the very domain where abundant reserves could be tapped — the United States is going it alone. Workarounds with allies like Japan help but are no substitute for the authority that comes from writing the rules rather than reacting to them. 

China, by contrast, is diving in, securing exploration contracts, building processing capacity, and positioning itself to dominate the field. Russia is doing the same, while also pressing expansive (albeit contested) maritime claims in the Arctic. 

Here, too, U.S. absence carries a cost. Failing to ratify UNCLOS weakens Washington’s ability to challenge excessive Arctic claims and shape the legal framework governing extended continental shelves — an increasingly strategic domain as ice recedes and access expands. 

If Washington isn’t writing the rules, others will. Actually, they already are. 

For decades, that absence was risky, but manageable. U.S. power filled the gap. But as competition with China and Russia intensifies and international institutions become central arenas of that competition, influence requires participation. 

A Win Within Reach 

UNCLOS has long enjoyed broad, bipartisan support. The military relies on it for navigational certainty, industry for legal clarity and market access, and environmental groups for the safeguards it provides. 

Let’s take the win — and finally ratify the Law of the Sea.